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I. INTRODUCTION 
All parties agree counties have broad police powers under Article XII, § 2 of the Idaho 
Constitution to enact ordinances that are not in conflict with the general laws and that Idaho 
Code § 67-6529(2) allows counties to enact ordinances "to regulate the siting of' Confined 
Animal Feeding Operations ("CAFOs"). The parties disagree, however, on a county's authority 
to enact ordinances to regulate the operation of a CAFO to protect water quality when water 
quality is comprehensively regulated by state and federal law. 
Water quality is a statewide concern that is not, and should not, be micro-managed at the 
county level whereby inconsistent and varying regulations may be enacted. Like the regulation 
of the field of hazardous waste disposal in Envirosafe Serv. of Idaho, Inc. v. County of Owyhee, 
112 Idaho 687, 735 P.2d 998 (1987), the regulation of water quality "is uniquely susceptible of, 
and appropriate for, uniform statewide regulation." Id. at 692, 735 P.2d at 1003. Indeed, such 
statewide regulation is already in place and should not be undermined by a county's over-
extension of its land use planning authority. , 
Respondent Gooding County ("Gooding") 1 and Amicus Curiae Idaho Association of 
Counties, Inc. (the "Counties") argue that each of Idaho's 44 counties must be allowed to 
independently regulate water quality at CAFOs within their borders under the Local Land Use 
and Planning Act, Idaho Code § 67-6501, et seq. ("LLUPA") and that Appellants Idaho 
Dairymen's Association, Inc. and The Idaho Cattle Association, Inc. ("IDA/ICA") arguments to 
1 IDA/ICA objects to the late-filed and over length brief submitted by Gooding and through 
responding to arguments raised in its and the Counties' briefs, does not waive its objection to the 
timeliness or length of Gooding's Respondent's Brief. 
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the contrary are neither supported by law nor desirable. Gooding further argues the challenged 
provisions of its CAFO Ordinance No. 90 (the "Ordinance"), purportedly enacted to protect 
water quality in the county, are not arbitrary, capricious or adopted without a rational basis, in 
violation of the substantive due process protections of the state and federal constitutions. 
Gooding also characterizes IDA/ICA's dormant commerce clause argument as a "red herring." 
Finally, Gooding argues it is entitled to attorneys' fees on appeal because IDA/ICA's appeal was 
pursued without a reasonable basis in fact or law. As set forth below, each of these contentions 
must be rejected. 
II. DISCUSSION 
A. Gooding's Attempts to Regulate Water Quality at CAFOs is Impliedly 
Preempted by State and Federal Law. 
Gooding and the Counties argue they are not impliedly preempted from regulating 
CAFOs to protect water quality for at least three reasons: (1) LLUP A allows counties to enact 
regulations related to the "siting" of CAFOs and to consider water quality in enacting local 
ordinances, therefore, a finding of implied preemption cannot be made; (2) Envirosafe Serv. of 
Idaho, Inc. v. County a/Owyhee, 112 Idaho 687, 735 P.2d 998 (1987), the pre-eminent case on 
implied preemption in Idaho, relied upon by IDA/ICA, is distinguishable and, therefore, does not 
govern this matter; and (3) in any event, finding implied preemption is not desirable in this case. 
Each of these contentions should be rejected. 
2 
I. Neither LLUPA, Nor the Site Advisory Team Suitability Determination 
Act, Grant Counties Authority to Regulate the Operation of CAFOs to 
Protect Water Quality. 
In response to IDA/ICA's arguments that state and federal law have comprehensively 
regulated the operation of CAFOs to maintain and protect water quality, Gooding and the 
Counties point to their ability to "regulate the siting of large confined animal feeding operations 
and facilities" under Idaho Code§ 67-6529(2) (emphasis added) and their "broad powers in the 
area of planning and zoning" under LLUP A to protect the natural resources of the state and to 
avoid "undue water and air pollution." Gooding Br. at 12; Counties' Br. at 12-14. But, siting a 
CAPO does not equate to regulating the operations of a CAPO; these regulations are left to the 
state and federal government. Further, contrary to the Counties' assertion, the Site Advisory 
Team Suitability Detennination Act, Idaho Code Sections 67-6529A-67-6529G, does not grant 
counties broad powers to generally oversee and administer CAFOs. Rather, the Site Advisory 
Team Suitability Determination Act, as its name suggests, is specifically limited to the siting of 
CAFOs and, if anything, supports the notion that CAPO administration is an extremely complex 
area that is best left to uniform state regulation. 
Neither the Site Advisory Team Suitability Detennination Act nor LLUP A expand the 
counties' powers to issues of water quality. LLUPA and the Site Advisory Team Suitability 
Determination Act create a role for counties in the initial determination of where a CAPO will be 
located and nothing more. They do not, as the Counties suggest, confer any authority on the 
counties to enact ordinances intended to "protect" local water quality. As this Court implicitly 
recognized in Ralph Naylor Farms, LLC v. Latah County, 144 Idaho 806, 810, 172 P .3d I 081, 
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I 085 (2007), a county's power to "consider" water quality pursuant to LLUPA does not amount 
to the power to enact water quality standards and regulations, which powers reside solely with 
the state and federal governments. Similar reasoning applies to the Site Advisory Team 
Suitability Determination Act - it is not a blanket grant of authority for counties to regulate water 
quality issues. 
Gooding and the Counties also assert they have broad police power to protect health, 
safety and welfare and must take into account much more than water quality within a CAPO. 
Counties' Br. at I 7-18. The counties' police power is not unlimited, however. Article XII, § 2 
of the Idaho Constitution specifically provides counties cannot make and enforce regulations that 
are in conflict with the general laws. In recognition of this limitation, Idaho Code § 31-714 
grants the board of county commissioners the power to "pass all ordinances and rules and make 
all regulations, not repugnant to law ... necessary and proper to provide for the safety, promote 
the health and prosperity ... of the county and the inhabitants thereof ... " (emphasis added). 
The Ordinance cannot stand under these provisions because it imposes restrictions on CAFOs in 
an arena that is already fully occupied by state and federal regulation. 
A review of the Gooding County Commission's intent and purpose in passmg the 
Ordinance reveals Gooding' s primary concern in promulgating the Ordinance was to protect 
local water quality. See R. Vol. II, pp. 138-39 (reciting Gooding's concerns regarding the effect 
CAFO's have on Gooding's "soil and water resources"). Gooding and the Counties further 
argne one cannot "divorce the matter of 'water quality' from the role of proper planning and 
zoning." Counties' Br. at 7. Idaho counties, however, do not have the power to set water quality 
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standards for the state. Counties may "consider" water quality when deciding how to zone a 
particular area and what uses will be allowed in that zone - but this does not confer upon them 
the power to enact water quality regulation. 
2. Envirosafe is Directly on Point and Governs the Disposition of This 
Matter. 
Gooding and the Counties claim Envirosafe Serv. of Idaho v. County of Owyhee, 
112 Idaho 687, 689 735 P.2d 998, 1000 (1987), is factually distinguishable and, therefore, its 
central holding on implied preemption does not apply. Gooding Br. at 17-19; Counties' Br. at 
I 9-20. Gooding and the Counties, however, fail to adequately apply the implied preemption 
framework this Court articulated in Envirosafe to the facts of this case. IDA/ICA cite Envirosafe 
for its careful analysis of the doctrine of implied preemption; they do not argue it is directly 
factually analogous to this case. Rather, IDA/ICA acknowledge the statutes and Ordinance at 
issue must be examined under the framework Envirosafe provides. 
In Envirosafe, the Court found the Hazardous Waste Management Act of 1983 
("HWMA") evidenced a strong legislative intent to occupy the field; the HWMA was, in fact, 
broad enough to occupy the field of hazardous waste management and preempt local regulation; 
and the nature and subject matter at issue called for a uniform statewide regulatory scheme. Any 
one of these findings would have been sufficient to find preemption, however. 
Here, there is no dispute CAFOs impact the environment and that many complex 
scientific factors must be considered and understood to properly regulate them. R. Vol. I, 
pp. 119-20; R. Vol. III, pp. 359-63. Further, there is no dispute one of the greatest concerns in 
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CAFO regulation and management is their potential impact on water quality, both on the local 
and state level. R. Vol. II, pp. 204-06. Contrary to Gooding's and the Counties' arguments, 
application of Envirosafe makes it clear that an overriding concern like environmental protection 
weighs in favor of preemption and uniform, statewide CAFO regulation. As previously 
discussed, in recognition of the importance of water quality, the state and federal government 
have enacted a comprehensive regulatory framework designed to preserve and protect water 
quality. See generally Appellants' Br. at 14-25. Under the National Pollutant Discharge 
Elimination System ("NPDES") and Nutrient Management Plan ("NMP") programs and 
associated enviromnental laws and regulations, the state and federal government carefully and 
comprehensively examine and regulate each individual CAFO's enviromnental impact. 
Therefore, the state, pursuant to federal mandate, has already enacted a comprehensive program 
to address the primary concern the Ordinance purports to address - water quality. Just like 
Owyhee County in Envirosafe, Gooding and the Counties "cannot act in an area which is so 
completely covered by general law as to indicate that it is a matter of state concern. '1 Envirosafe, 
112 Idaho at 689, 735 P.2d at 1000. 
The Counties argue the Court should reject IDA/ICA's reliance on the Idaho 
Legislature's unequivocal declaration in the Beef Cattle Act that the "department (of agriculture] 
shall have authority to administer all laws to protect the quality of water within the confines of a 
beef cattle animal feeding operation." LC. § 22-4902 (emphasis added). Citing Idaho Comm 'n 
on Human Rights v. Campbell, 95 Idaho 215, 506 P.2d 112 (1973), the Counties attempt to 
dismiss this provision because it is contained in the preamble to the Beef Cattle Act. Counties' 
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Br. at 7. The Idaho Comm 'n of Human Rights case had nothing to do with preemption and 
provides little, if any, instruction in the case at hand. In Idaho Comm 'n of Human Rights, the 
Idaho Commission of Human Rights ("Commission") filed a lawsuit and sought to enjoin a 
school from enforcing a regulation pertaining to acceptable standards for the length of hair of 
male students. The school district moved to dismiss the claim and the district court granted the 
motion. Idaho Comm'n of Human Rights, 95 Idaho at 216,506 P.2d at 113. In dismissing the 
claim, the district court found the statutory preamble contained at Idaho Code Section 
67-5901 (2) controlled over the later specific provisions contained of Idaho Code Section 
67-5909. Id. This Court reversed, pointing out a statutory preamble "is prefatory and declarative 
of public policy" and does not necessarily confer or enlarge statutory power. Id. at 217, 506 P.2d 
at 114. 
In contrast to the Idaho Comm 'n of Human Rights case, the issue of legislative intent is of 
critical importance in this case because determining legislative intent is an important part of 
implied preemption analysis. See Envirosafe, 112 Idaho at 689, 735 P.2d at 1000. Here; the 
Idaho Legislature's intent is clear that the "department [of agriculture] shall have authority to 
administer all laws to protect the quality of water within the confines of a beef cattle animal 
feeding operation." LC. § 22-4902 (emphasis added); see also l.C. § 22-4902 (the Beef Cattle 
Act "is intended to ensure that manure and process wastewater associated with beef cattle 
operations are handled in a manner" to protect the state's natural resources). 
It is also important to remember the Beef Cattle Act and Dairy Act are all part of a much 
greater and highly complex regulatory framework relating to water quality and a CAFO's 
7 
environmental impact. CAFOs are a highly regulated industry subject to numerous regulations, 
including NMPs and the NPDES permitting processes, that specifically address water quality 
concerns. Simply stated, in such a highly regulated and complex administrative scheme, there is 
no room for Gooding and the other counties to impose additional restrictions upon CAFOs' 
day-to-day operations. 
The Counties cite Benewah County Cattlemen's Ass 'n Inc. v. Bd. of County Comm 'rs of 
Benewah County, 105 Idaho 209, 668 P.2d 85 (1983), and Voyles v. City of Nampa, 97 Idaho 
597,548 P.2d 1217 (1976), for the proposition counties may lawfully enact ordinances that 
extend state law, but do not conflict with it. See Counties' Br. at 5, 17. While this statement of 
law may be true in the abstract, it is not applicable in this case and both cases are distinguishable. 
In Benewah County Cattlemen's Ass 'n, this Court found the ordinance at issue prohibiting 
livestock from running at large in the county did not directly conflict with state regulations, but 
merely extended state regulations. Benewah County Cattlemen's Ass 'n, Inc., I 05 Idaho at 214, 
668 P.2d at 90. Here, the Ordinance directly conflicts with state law and regulations because, for 
instance, it purports to limit animal unit density to numbers less than those allowed under a 
CAFO's NMP. See R. Vol. II, p. 150. 
In short, in the name of protecting water quality, the Ordinance expressly prohibits 
activities and animal unit density numbers explicitly approved and allowed by state water quality 
laws as administered by the departments charged with the true responsibility to administer "all 
laws" regulating water quality issues at CAFOs. When understood in this context, the Ordinance 
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directly conflicts with state law and is not, as the Counties suggest, merely a valid extension of 
state law. 
Similarly, in Voyles, the court held a local ordinance making it a misdemeanor to be 
drunk or intoxicated in a private motor vehicle located upon a public place did not conflict with 
state law. 97 Idaho at 600, 548 P.2d at 1220. In reaching its conclusion, the court found the 
ordinance in question did not violate Idaho Const. Art XII, § 2 or otherwise conflict with the 
state Uniform Act Regulating Traffic on Highways because the ordinance did not purport to 
regulate traffic, only public intoxication, which was within the purvey of local authority. As 
discussed above, Gooding County's Ordinance purports to regulate CAPO management, namely 
animal unit density numbers, which places it directly in conflict with state and federal laws and 
regulations, and it cannot stand. 
3. A Finding of Implied Preemption is Warranted and Desirable to Maintain 
the Overall Quality of Water in Idaho. 
There is a very real and justified concern that Idaho's counties, if given the authority to 
individually regulate CAPO waste management, would enact varying and conflicting CAPO 
ordinances. This is a complex and highly regulated field, already subject to myriad state and 
federal regulations and requirements. Rather than enhancing environmental protection, allowing 
local CAPO regulation would only undermine the comprehensive state and federal CAPO 
regulatory scheme that already is in place. If the ultimate goal is to protect the waters and 
environment of the state of Idaho, the task is best left in the hands of a statewide authority with 
the resources and experience to properly address such complex issues. 
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The Counties argue IDNICA cannot "point to a single case or single state statute 
anywhere in the nation that supports the position that CAFOs should be regulated only at the 
state level." Counties' Br. at 21. This argument fails to acknowledge or distinguish the North 
Carolina case of Craig v. County of Chatham, 356 N.C. 40, 565 S.E.2d 172 (2002), where the 
North Carolina Supreme Court held state law preempted a county swine ordinance that imposed 
more stringent requirements than the state's farm regulations.2 
Finally, the Counties argue the Court should reject their erroneous characterization of 
IDNICA's position that "the mere acquisition of an NMP in compliance with the state and 
federal laws regarding discharge of pollutants into the surface waters of the United States should 
immunize" CAFOs from local regulation. First, this is a mischaracterization of IDA/ICA's 
position. IDA/ICA's actual position is that state and federal regulation is so comprehensive it 
occupies the field to such an extent there is no room for local regulation, especially those that 
conflict with the state and federal requirements. Second, CAFOs are subject to very specific 
state and federal regulations (including odor and dust management, air quality regulation, etc.); 
NMPs and NPDES permits are just one aspect of the overall regulatory process. Obtaining an 
NMP, however, is a very thorough and demanding process that requires consideration of 
2 Further, on May 12, 2009, Oklahoma enacted a new statute that specifically prohibited any 
"municipality, county, or other political subdivision" from enacting or enforcing "any order, 
ordinance, or regulation concerning the care and handling of livestock within its jurisdiction that 
is more restrictive than rules promulgated by the Oklahoma Department of Agriculture, Food, 
Forestry concerning the care and handling of livestock." 2009 O.S.L. 180 (HB 2151)). Through 
this bill, Oklahoma, a state, like Idaho, that is heavily dependant on an agricultural economy, 
codified statewide preemption of local livestock laws. Not only is this law consistent with 
IDNICA's position, but it makes sense given the comprehensive regulatory scheme on the issue. 
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numerous factors bearing on the concerns Gooding has expressed, especially its primary concern 
of environmental contamination. See R. Vol. III, pp. 359-63 (Affidavit of M. Patten, ISDA 
CAFO/Dairy Bureau Chief, describing in detail the process and considerations that go into a 
NMP). 
B. The Challenged Portions of the Ordinance Violate Due Process. 
IDA/I CA allege Section VII(D)(I) of the Ordinance violates their substantive due process 
rights because it arbitrarily limits the number of animals a CAPO owner or operator may keep, 
mandates the land used to calculate the permissible animal density be limited to "tillable, 
inigated acrefsl" of land "owned by the CAPO applicant," and mandates the "land base used to 
support" the animals at a CAPO "be in Gooding County with the exception of contiguous land in 
an adjacent county." R. Vol. II, p. 150 ( emphasis added). Gooding disagrees with this 
contention, but does little more than block quote large portions of the district court's decision on 
summary judgment to support its position. 
Much of IDNICA's due process arguments rest on the fact the challenged provisions of 
the Ordinance require ownership of land in Gooding County and the implicit assumption aJI 
animal waste produced at a Gooding County CAPO will be directly applied to land at that 
CAPO. These provisions are arbitrary and without a rational basis because: (I) pursuant to their 
NMPs, not aJI CAPO operators dispose of all of their waste through direct land application; 
(2) the land used by the CAPOs for nutrient application may not be located in Gooding County; 
and (3) the land need not be owned by the CAPO - the CAPO simply needs a right to use the 
land for application of nutrient bearing animal waste. Moreover, state-approved NMPs (and the 
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corresponding rules governing dairy and beef cattle waste) allow CAFO operators to lawfully 
dispose of their animal waste through a variety of methods, including exporting animal waste 
off-site, composting or digesting. If a CAFO operator exports all, or even some of its waste off-
site, there is no rational reason for limiting the number of animal units it may maintain on its 
acreage in order to protect water quality. 
The Ordinance is a cagey way to limit the number of animal units in Gooding County and 
to arbitrarily set a finite limit on the total number of animal units present in the county. 
Examined at its most fundamental level, the Ordinance operates to create a high barrier of entry 
for new or expanded CAFOs in the county by requiring a prohibitive capital outlay for the 
otherwise unnecessary acquisition of land in, or contiguous to, Gooding County that may, or may 
not, be used by the CAFO for nutrient management purposes. 
At Gooding's invitation, the court below focused solely on direct land application of 
animal waste on land owned by the CAFO and failed to recognize the Ordinance's arbitrary 
nature. The district court found the Ordinance's five (5) animal unit density cap "was not wholly 
arbitrary" because it related to the recitals in the Ordinance's Preamble indicating, inter alia, that 
"densities of up to ten (I 0) animals per acre has resulted in the over application of animal waste 
on existing agricultural land and that higher animal numbers and continued over application of 
animal waste has increased potential to contaminate both agricultural soil and water resources," 
R. Vol. VI, pp. 1194-195 (emphasis added). Implicit in the district court's finding was that 
fewer animals per acre will protect the county's natural resources because all of the animal waste 
from a CAFO must be direct land applied at the CAFO - this faulty assumption runs contrary to 
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NMPs and CAFOs' actual practices in Gooding County. It is wholly arbitrary to seek to address 
water quality issues at CAFOs by limiting the number of animal units at a particular CAFO if all 
animal waste is not assumed to be directly applied to such land. When CAFOs' actual practices, 
which involve moving toward less land application on their own land, are included in the 
equation, the Ordinance's "rational basis" crumbles. 
I. The Ordinance's One-Size-Fits-All Animal Unit Density Cap ls Arbitrary, 
Capricious and Established Without A Rationale Basis. 
Here, the district court rejected IDA/ICA's argument that the Ordinance's five (5) animal 
unit density cap was arbitrary because it conflicts with state-approved, site-specific NMPs 
allowing for greater animal densities at CAFOs. The trial court found "NMPs only relate to the 
land application of animal waste" and the Ordinance "was not focused solely on the land 
application of animal waste from CAFOs when creating Ordinance #90," R. Vol. VI, p. 1195. 
But, this finding is factually incorrect. 
NMPs do not only "relate to the land application of animal waste;" rather, they are plans 
that manage how all animal waste is disposed of at CAFOs using any method. See e.g., R. Vol. 
III, pp, 359-63. Moreover, state and federal law require certified nutrient management planners 
to consider things such as odor and dust management and air and water quality when producing a 
NMP. See R. Vol. III, p. 359 - R. Vol. V, p. 997, Accordingly, the same concerns expressed in 
the Preamble of the Ordinance and relied upon by the district court are the concerns specifically 
considered by the state of Idaho in approving NMPs. TI1e difference is that NMPs look at each 
CAFO individually to determine its appropriate animal density; whereas, the Ordinance sets a 
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one-size fits all animal unit density for all CAFOs in Gooding, regardless of the method(s) used 
to manage nutrient rich animal waste and/or the site's specific geological features. Such a 
method is wholly arbitrary and without a rational basis and, therefore, violates the due process 
protections of the state and federal constitutions. 
Moreover, the Ordinance's variance procedure, too, arbitrarily limits the maximum 
animal unit density to seven (7) animal units per irrigated tillable acre. Although the Ordinance 
purports to require consideration of whether or not the "CAFO operator employs multiple, 
proven, environmental technologies or methods to enhance or improve air, soil, and water 
quality," in reality, it does not. If the Ordinance properly took these factors into consideration, it 
would not arbitrarily limit the animal unit density to seven (7) animal units per irrigated tillable 
acre because, as both Dr. Ledbetter and Matt Thompson discussed in their respective affidavits, 
there are methods, such as composting and animal waste digesters, currently available that result 
in little or no application of untreated animal waste to agricultural ground. R. Vol. I, p. 12 I; R. 
Vol. I, pp. 125-27. 
2. The Ordinance's "Tillable, Irrigated" Acres Requirement Improperly Pre-
Supposes that all Animal Waste Will be Directly Land Applied and, 
Therefore, is Arbitrary and Capricious. 
In this case, the district court found the Ordinance's "tillable, irrigated" acres requirement 
was not arbitrary because it "protects from over-application of animal waste on land ... it 
requires the use of land which can grow crops which will 'uptake' or use some of the animal 
waste nutrients ... specific geological features ... are not conducive to keeping the waste 
contained or on the CAFO site and/or are not likely to properly absorb the waste." R. Vol. VI, 
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pp. 1198-199. Again, it is clear the district court believed (and found) this "tillable, irrigated" 
acres requirement was based on the fact all CAFO animal waste would be directly applied to the 
land at a CAFO. Because not all CAFOs in Gooding County use direct land application to 
dispose of 100% of their animal waste, such a requirement is arbitrary and without a rational 
basis. 
3. The Ordinance's Land Ownership Requirement is Arbitrary and 
Capricious. 
The district court also found the Ordinance's land ownership requirement was not 
arbitrary for two reasons: (1) it "protects from the possibility of the CAFO applicant combining 
owned land together with leased land as a basis for the calculation of the animal density, which 
could lead to the animal density being established and later the leasehold estate of the land 
ending" (R. Vol. VI, p. 1197); and (2) "enforcing CAFO permit requirements/violations against 
one holding only a leasehold interest can become far more problematic to the County." Id. Such 
a conclusion is speculative at best and wholly arbitrary and irrational at worst. There is no 
evidence in the record to support the "possible" problems the district court cites. These 
"problems" are easily addressed and, in fact, are already addressed because the Ordinance 
requires permittees to continue to comply with the requirements of the Ordinance after a permit 
is issued. R. Vol. I, p. 18. If the permit is based upon a lease or other agreement regarding 
animal waste distribution and the lease or agreement terminates, the permittee would be subject 
to the Ordinance's penalty provisions. 
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These two supposed justifications for the Ordinance's land ownership requirement are 
insufficient to satisfy the due process protections to which IDA/ICA members are entitled. The 
requirement a CAFO operator own all land used to calculate animal density - as compared to 
leasing or otherwise controlling such land or even having an agreement with a third party who 
agrees to accept animal waste for application or other purposes- is arbitrary and capricious. 
C. Section VII.D.1. of the Ordinance Either Violates Due Process or the 
Dormant Commerce Clause Depending on the Court's Interpretation, But in 
Either Event, It Cannot Stand. 
Section VII.D.l. of the Ordinance, dealing with the calculation used to established 
acceptable animal unit densities, states: "The land base to support the animal units is required to 
be in Gooding county with the exception of contiguous land in an adjacent county." R. Vol. I, p. 
32. IDAIICA allege the phrase "land base to support the animal units" - particularly when 
understood in conjunction with the other provisions of the Ordinance that assume that all animal 
waste will be directly applied to the CAFO's land for purposes of calculating animal densities -
requires that all animal waste for the animal units approved at a Gooding County CAFO must be 
disposed of on site (i.e., not disposed of outside of Gooding County or contiguous land in an 
adjacent county). As set forth in IDA/ICA's opening brief, such a requirement would constitute 
an unlawful restraint of trade in violation of Article I, section 8, clause 3 of the United States 
Constitution. Appellants' Br. at 32-38. 
The district court found the challenged provision did not restrict a CAFO operator from 
disposing of their waste outside of the county. Rather, the trial court found the phrase "simply 
means that only land in Gooding County or contiguous land in an adjacent county may be used 
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by a CAPO applicant to calculate the maximum density of animals allowed on the CAFO located 
in Gooding County." R. Vol. VI, p. 1187. On appeal, Gooding argues IDA/ICA's dormant 
commerce clause argument is a "red herring calculated to add confusion and create vagueness 
where there is none." Gooding Br. atp. 19. 
Both Gooding and the district court, however, missed the thrust of IDA/ICA's dormant 
commerce clause argument that must be understood and considered in context of the rest of their 
arguments below and now on appeal. Because Section VII.D. l. of the Ordinance necessarily 
relates to the ground application of animal waste, this provision either means (I) the CAFO must 
dispose of animal waste in Gooding County, which is a violation of the dormant commerce 
clause; or (2) the provision is arbitrary because it requires some amount of land in Gooding 
County to calculate animal density when animal waste may be shipped off-site for application or 
processing, which violates due process protections. Either way the animal unit density 
restrictions of Section VII.D.l. cannot stand. Simply stated, if the Ordinance does not restrict the 
export of animal waste, then°it is arbitrary because it requires land ownership in Gooding County 
that does not relate in any way to the number of animal units a CAFO can safely and lawfully 
support. 
D. Gooding is not Entitled to an Award of Attorneys' Fees on Appeal. 
Gooding claims it is entitled to an award of its attorneys' fees on appeal under Idaho 
Code§ 12-117 and/or Idaho Code§ 12-121. See Respondent's Br. at 32-33. Such an award in 
not warranted, regardless of the Court's ultimate decision on the merits. 
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This Court recently held that in order to award attorneys' fees on appeal under Idaho 
Code§ 12-117, the Court must find for the County and that the appeal was brought "without a 
reasonable basis in fact or law." Spencer v. Kootenai County, 145 Idaho 448, 458, 180 P. 3d 
487, 497 (2008). Similarly, an award of attorneys' fees on appeal under Idaho Code§ 12-121 
will not ordinarily be awarded "where the losing party brought the appeal in good faith and 
where a genuine issue of law was presented." Chisholm v. Twin Falls County, 139 ldaho 131, 
136, 75 P.3d 185, 190 (2003). As such, an award of attorneys fees on appeal to a prevailing 
party is "discretionary, and attorneys fees are not awarded as a matter of right." Id. 
Here, regardless of the final outcome of this appeal, there can be no award of attorneys' 
fees to Gooding under either Idaho Code§§ 12-117 or 12-121 because IDA/ICA's action was 
brought in good faith and presented a matter of first impression to this Court on a matter of 
sweeping public interest. Indeed, in Ralph Naylor Farms, LLC v. Latah County, 144 Idaho 806, 
172 P.3d 1081 (2007), a similar issue was addressed indirectly through the Court's consideration 
of a request for attorneys' fees under Idaho Code § 12-117. In that case, the trial court struck 
down a county ordinance because it "implicitly conflicted with state statutes regulating water 
appropriation and quality." 144 Idaho at 810, 172 P.3d at 1085. Latah County argued against an 
award of attorneys' fees in that matter because "there is little, if any, legal authority addressing 
the relationship between the Local Land Use Planning Act (LLUP A), which directs counties to 
consider water quantity and quality, and other provisions of Idaho law putting the State in charge 
of water permits." Id. This Court agreed there was "a legitimate question about the validity of 
the County's actions in adopting the ordinance" and, therefore, denied the request for attorneys' 
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fees on appeal. 144 Idaho at 811, 172 P.3d at 1086. As is Ralph Naylor Farms, this Court 
should deny Gooding's request for attorneys' fees on appeal because there is a legitimate 
question about the boundaries of a county's authority to regulate water quality at CAPOs 
pursuant to their land use authority under LLUP A. 
E. Should IDA/ICA Prevail in Whole or in Part, an Award of Attorneys' Fees is 
Warranted. 
IDA/I CA have sought an award of its reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred in this 
action, should it prevail in whole or in part, pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121, the private 
attorney general doctrine and/or 42 U.S.C. § 1988. See Appellants' Br. at 38-42. Neither 
Gooding nor the Counties address this issue. Accordingly, IDA/ICA respectfully request such an 
award as set forth in its initial brief. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Despite its protestations that "Gooding County is not an enemy of the CAPO operators" 
(Respondent's Br. at 30), Gooding has done everything in its power - and beyond - to severely 
limit a CAPO operator's ability to modify its existing operations in order to meet changing 
market conditions, let alone have an operator start a new operation in the county. This is 
remarkable since CAPO operators in Gooding County make up a substantial portion of the local 
economy and, without them, Gooding County's economy would be devastated. See Gooding's 
Br. at 31 ("Agriculture is the County's life blood"); R. Vol. III, pp. 362-63 (in 2006, Gooding 
had 29 beef cattle producers and 99 dairy producers). Accordingly, in the words of William 
Shakespeare, "The [county] doth protest too much, methinks." WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, 
HAMLET, ACT 3, SC. 2. 
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Gooding claims it merely wants to require its CAFO operators to be "good neighbor[ s] to 
Gooding County's other citizens." Gooding's Br. at 30. If being a "good neighbor" means 
requiring CAFO operators to adhere to strict environmental requirements of state and federal law 
- IDA/ICA agree and are already held accountable in that measure. See R. Vol. III, p. 999 
(Gooding CAFO operators subject to inspections for compliance with state/federal law). If being 
a "good neighbor" means enacting conflicting, duplicative, burdensome and/or expensive local 
regulation so as to severely limit any growth or future development of the industry in the county 
and, at worst, cause CAFO producers to cease business, then IDA/ICA strongly disagree and 
assert Gooding has over-stepped its legal authority. 
Water quality is a statewide concern that is appropriately handled at the state, not local, 
level. The state recognized this when it enacted comprehensive laws and regulations to ensure 
the quality of water throughout the state and compliance with federal law. LLUP A does not alter 
this comprehensive scheme so as to allow counties to enact their own water quality regulations, 
nor does it allow counties to adopt arbitrary regulations that significantly affect CAFO operators' 
property rights. Accordingly, IDA/ICA respectfully request the Court reverse the trial court's 
decision and hold the challenged portions of the Ordinance are impliedly preempted by state and 
federal law and violate due process protections and the commerce clause of the federal 
constitution. 
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DATED this 11th day of June 2009. 
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